DevMeth
C31

Access & auth

IDOR Check — Can Users Reach Each Other's Records by Changing an Id?

DevMeth checks the 48 known AI-code failure patterns — not a penetration test or a security guarantee.

What the issue is

An endpoint that looks up records by an id from the request, without checking the record belongs to the signed-in user, lets any account read or change other users' data by editing the id in the URL.

Why AI tools generate it

AI-generated routes usually include the login check but not the ownership check — the demo works, the gap is invisible, and the endpoint ships trusting the client to send honest ids.

How DevMeth detects it

A code scan finds handlers that query by a request-supplied id while your own schema and other queries treat the data as user-owned, then flags the ones with no ownership predicate on the query.

C31
What a finding looks like
Critical

Your API lets any signed-in user read or change other people's records

WHAT WE FOUND

C31 — masked sample

Sample — illustrative and masked exactly as a real report shows it. Run a free scan to see your own results.

The fix, in three steps

Scope every by-id query to the signed-in user (add their id to the where clause), return 404 for foreign records, and never trust the client-supplied id alone. Three steps.

Run a free scan and each finding carries a paste-ready fix prompt you can act on.

Try a free scan

FAQ

DevMeth checks the 48 known AI-code failure patterns — not a penetration test or a security guarantee. A clear result means each known pattern was checked and found clear or not applicable for your app; it is not a guarantee of security.